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ABSTRACT 
This working paper examines the question whether food is a limiting factor for population 
growth. It argues that we must distinguish five levels of food production capacity: (1) the bio- 
physical maximum carrying capacity of the earth, which is roughly equivalent to its "Net Primary 
Production" (NPP). This purely hypothetical production potential, however, must be decreased 
due to various constraints and restrictions. Thus, we must study the world's food production 
capacity as determined by (2) technical and logistic restrictions limitations, (3) environmental 
constraints and feedback mechanisms, (4) economic limitations, and (5) socio-cultural conditions. 
The key for balancing people and food is the speed with which constraints can be pushed back 
or modified that hinder people to utilize the full potential of the earth's food resources in a 
sustainable way. Technology could easily increase the earth's carrying capacity for sustaining a 
12 to 14 biUion world population if it is applied with ecological care and in the framework of an 
economically sound and socially-just development policy. The carrying capacity of the earth is 
not a natural constant--it is a dynamic equilibrium, essentially determined by human action. 
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HOW MANY PEOPLE CAN BE FED ON EARTH? 
Gerhard K HeiIig 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This working paper examines the question whether food is a limiting factor for population 
growth. Many distinguished writers have studied the problem. Since the time when Malthus 
started the debate some 200 years ago1 thousands of books, research papers, and study reports 
have been published on the s ~ b j e c t . ~ / ~ / ~ / ~ / ~  Despite these intense efforts, we are still far from 
consensus. A screening of available literature on estimating the earth's population carrying 
capacity reveals surprising diversity of results. In 1945 FA. Pearson and F.A. Harper calculated 
that between 902 million and 2.8 billion people could be supported by the earth's agriculture.' 
Some 20 years later C. Clark estimated the sustainable population maximum of the earth to 
range between 40 and 147 billion (!).' However, in the late 1960s P. Buringh and others 
considered the world food production potential as equivalent to just 5.3 billion p e ~ p l e . ~  In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s a large FA0 study concluded that on Third World soils alone, 
between 3.9 and 32.4 billion people could be fed, depending on the level of agricultural inputs.'O 
Only a decade ago Simon's Ultimute Resource became a popular book." It resolutely denied any 
limits to (population) growth; people were considered the "ultimate resource". Today the 
He was not the first scholar dealing with the problem, but probably the most influential. See: Malthus, 
R. (1%7): Essay on the Principle of Population. 7th ed. London (Dent) (Original: 1798); Ricardo, D. (1964): 
m e  Principles of Political Economy and Taration. London (Dent) 
Boserup, E. (1981): Population and Technological Change. Chicago (University of Chicago Press) 
' Boserup, E. (1%5): m e  Conditions of Agricultural Growth. Chicago (Aldine) 
' Clark, C. (1%7): Population Growtlt and Land Use. London (The Macmillan Press), Chapter IV: 
Population and Food. 
Clark, C. and Haswell, M. (1964): m e  Economics of Subsistence Agiculhlre. London (Mamillan) 
Livi Bacci, M. (1991): Population and Nutition. Essay on the Demographic History of Europe. Cambridge 
(Cambridge University Press) 
' Pearson, FA. and Harper, FA. (1945): m e  World's Hunger. New York (Cornell University Press) 
Clark, C. (1%7): op. cit. 
9 Buringh, P., Van Heemst, H.D J., and Staring, G J. (1975): Computation of the Absolute Maximum Food 
Production of the World. Wageningen (Center for World Food Market Research) 
lo H i e n s ,  G.M., Kassam, A.H., Naiken, L., Fischer, G., and Shah, M.M. (1983): Potential Population 
Supporting Capacities of Lands in the Developing World. Technical Report FPA/INT/513 of Project Land 
Resources for Population of the Future. Rome (FAO) 
" Simon, J. (1981): m e  Ultimate Resource. Princeton (Princeton University Press) 
Meadows' Beyond the Limits is a b e s t ~ e l l e r . ~  They argue that we have already passed the limits 
of sustainability and are  on the way to  ecological disaster. In their 1992 report the World 
Resource Institute published a wealth of data and analyses which imply that we are  already 
approaching ecological limits in many sectors of our economies, including agriculture." Most 
recently Paul and Anne Ehrlich, together with Gretchen Daily, analyzed the subject. According 
to  their estimate it is "doubtful ... whether food security could be achieved indefinitely for a global 
population of 10 or  12 billion people." They thought it "rather likely that a sustainable 
population, one comfortable below the earth's nutritional capacity, will number far fewer than 
today's 5.5 billion people...".14 There are  many other s t u d i e ~ , ' ~  but probably the highest 
estimate of the globe's population carrying capacity was published by C. Marchetti, who, in 1978, 
argued that a world population of 1000 billion people would not be impossible.16 
Obviously, these numbers are  not much of a help t o  the student of future population trends. One  
reason for the large discrepancies are  methodological divergences of the various approaches. 
Some authors deal with global averages of carrying capacity, while others study small 
agroecological areas and only later aggregate the results. Some authors base their estimates on 
the most advanced agricultural technology or  assume future innovation; others define the 
carrying capacity in terms of current, in some regions rather low levels of agricultural output. 
Biologists usually explain carrying capacity as the balance between natural resources and the 
number of people--social scientists consider human resources the critical factor and accentuate 
social limits to  growth. More systematically we can identify four reasons for the conceptual con- 
fusion: there is (1) dissent about the reference area, (2) disagreement about the means of 
sustenance, (3) controversy on the mode of reaction t o  limitations; and (4) confusion about the 
time frame. We will later discuss some of these problems in detail. For the moment we can only 
conclude that there a re  more dimensions to  the problem than one would expect at first sight. It 
seems to be necessary to combine the various aspects of the earth's carrying capacity into a 
consistent theoretical framework. This is what we will do next. 
2. DIMENSIONS OF THE EARTH'S CARRYING CAPACITY 
T o  see the major dimensions of the  problem, imagine a pipe through which the earth's food 
resources have t o  pass before they can be used for feeding people (see Figure 1). The  diameter 
of the pipe, however, is not constant. While it is quite large at the "input" side, it is significantly 
smaller at the "output" end. The  pipe's stepwise-decreasing diameter symbolized different kinds 
l2 Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., and Randers, J. (1992): Beyond the Limits: Global Collapse or a 
Sustainable Future. London (Earthscan Publications Limited) 
l3 The World Resources Institutephe United Nations Environment Programme/The United Nations 
Development Programme (1992): World Resoumes, 1992-93. New York, Oxford (Oxford University Press) 
'' Ehrlich, P., Ehrlich, A., and Daily, G.C. (1993): Food security, population, and environment. Population 
and Development Review 19(1):1-32 
l5 The World Hunger Programme at Brown University estimated that present agricultural production 
could sustain either 5.5 billion vegetarians or 3.7 billion people who eat 25% of their calories from animal 
products. In the late 1980s Paul and Anne Ehrlich published an estimate of 5 billion for the world's maximum 
population carrying capacity. See also: Cohen, J.E. (1992): How many people can earth hold? Discover 
(November), pp. 114-119 
l6 Marchetti, C. (1978): On Ten-to-the-power-twelve: A Check on Earth Canying Capacity for Man. 
Research Report, RR-78-7. Laxenburg, Austria (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) 
of restrictions to the earth's carrying capacity: technological, ecological, economic, and 
socio-cultural. 
(1) The hypothetical maximum carrying capacity: At the input side of our "conceptual pipe" 
we have the theoretical maximum of the earth's food production capacity. This purely 
hypothetical measure is roughly equivalent to what biologists have termed the "net primary 
production" (NPP) of the earth. The measure is based on the assumption that the ultimate 
limitation of food production is given by the energy conversion ratio of photosynthesis. This is 
the basic biochemical process by which green plants transform solar radiation into biomass. Since 
we (roughly) know the total solar radiation input of the earth, we can calculate the globe's 
maximum biomass production, which quantifies the initial product of all animal and human food 
chains. 
The NPP is only restricted by physical constants, such as the total solar radiation energy input 
of the earth1' and by natural laws that govern the biochemical processes of plant growth. In its 
most extreme version the measure not only ignores economic, social, cultural, or political 
restrictions of food production, but also technical constraints and ecological feedback 
mechanisms. It assumes homogeneous implementation of most advanced agricultural 
technologies throughout the world. Authors who have adopted this rather narrow definition of 
carrying capacity have estimated that the maximum world population that can be sustained 
indefinitely into the future would be in the range of 16 to 147 billion people--depending on the 
specific method applied.'' C. Marchetti's monstrous estimate of several thousand billion is 
based on a similar approach.19 
(2) Technical and logistic restrictions and chances: The previous definition of carrying capacity 
assumes homogeneous distribution and instantaneous implementation of (advanced) food 
production technology. But this is impossible in reality. Even existing agricultural technologies 
would need years before they could be used throughout the world. They have to be adapted to 
local conditions, integrated with existing food distribution channels, and often require previous 
implementation of service and support schemes. The production and distribution of regionally 
adapted high-yield seeds, for instance, can take years or decades. Also the breeding cycles in 
husbandry have to be taken into account. 
In addition to the usual delays in technology transfer, we have to realize that advanced 
agricultural methods are primarily available for good quality soils in temperate climates and for 
(sub)tropical irrigation cultures (such as Asian paddy rice crops). In the arid and semi-arid zones 
of Africa, however, we still have traditional pastoral systems which survived quite well as long 
as animal and human population density was low. But since the population has doubled or tripled 
the socioecological system is out of balance. The situation obviously requires new technology to 
increase productivity of food production. However, we cannot be sure that high-tech alternatives 
of animal husbandry which could potentially boost productivity by orders of magnitude, are 
adaptable to the hot and dry climate. Current experiments are not too promising. It is not 
l7 Usually 
can certainly 
concentration 
the total solar radiation input of earth is seen as a (near-) constant. However, at soil level, it 
vary considerably with specific atmospheric conditions, such as water vapor and dust 
in the higher atmosphere, as well as cloud cover conditions in the lower atmosphere. 
l8 Clark estimated that the earth could support between 47 people at American-type diet and 147 billion 
at a cereal subsistence diet. See: Clark, C. (1x7): op. cit. 
l9 Marchetti, C. (1978): op. cit. 
impossible that there simply is no high-tech alternative to traditional cattle ranging and primitive 
agriculture in certain parts of the world. We are just beginning to apply scientific methods to the 
management of arid or tropical soils, and it will probably take years or decades before we have 
drought-resistant high-yield crops and livestocks. 
This indicates that the global carrying capacity is certainly diminished by agrotechnical and 
logistic restrictions and delays. Some studies have tried to take this into account by defining 
different input levels for various agroclimatic regions. The FAO/LTNDP/IIASA study, for 
instance, assumed three levels of agricultural input which largely correspond to levels of 
t echno l~gy .~~  
(3) Ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms: Since agriculture and livestock 
production--as everything else--are embedded in a natural environment, we also have to take into 
account ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms, such as acidification, soil loss, 
groundwater pollution, or desertification. These consequences of intense agriculture and animal 
production can gradually diminish returns. Some ecologists have argued that over-utilization of 
arable land (and forest areas) in Europe and Northern America has already degraded the soils 
to such an extent that' artificial fertilization and soil management techniques cannot repair the 
damage. 
However, there is more to the ecological perspective than the necessary integration of 
environmentally-sound production systems into natural environments. For instance, we need to 
reserve space for the (still remaining) fauna and flora, if we want to avoid additional termination 
of whole strains of evolution. Keeping biodiversity at a high level is not (only) a matter of 
aesthetics and respect--a large pool of plant and animal genes could be a primary resource for 
future biosciences. We must also reserve natural space for human recreation. The 10 billion 
world population of the 21st century, cramped into multi-million urban agglomerates, will 
certainly need some of the potential crop area for leisure activities, such as playing golf or riding 
a horse. And finally, a significant proportion of our environment cannot be utilized for 
agriculture or cattle ranging because it has vital functions in stabilizing the climate. Cutting down 
tropical rain forests for agricultural expansion would probably backfire. It would trigger or speed 
up climate change which could worsen agricultural conditions elsewhere and diminish overall 
food production. These examples show that the ecologically sustainable population maximum is 
certainly below the theoretical or technologically feasible. 
(4) Economic barriers: Nothing in the world is free. Agricultural modernization and expansion 
is costly. One needs investment capital, functioning price mechanisms, adequate incentives for 
farmers, and a whole set of other economic conditions and mechanisms to boost food production 
for a multi-billion world population. Current estimates of a global carrying capacity usually ignore 
these economic dimensions. However, in real life we find numerous economic difficulties and 
limitations which further restrict global carrying capacity. Some studies have developed complex 
models that take into account prices and (international) trade, but their methodology and 
assumptions are debatable.2' 
" FAO/UNDP/ILASA (1982): Potential Population Suppodng Capacities of Lana3 in the Developing 
World. Technical Report of the Project, FPA/INT/513 
Parikh, K.S., Fischer, G., Frohberg, K., and Gulbrandsen, 0. (1988): Towara3 Free Trade in Apiculture. 
Dordrecht (Nijhoff) 

It is an illusion to believe that economic development is predictable for more than a few years. 
The fundamental changes in global economic patterns, from the rise of the "Asian Tigers" 
(Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia) and the economic boom in China to the 
total breakdown of Soviet and East European economies, should have taught us a lesson. The 
economic framework of agriculture is man-made and can be changed to the better or the worse. 
The earth's carrying capacity in the 21st century will be a matter of economic decisions at least 
to the same extent as it will be a matter of sufficient natural resources. Three aspects are  most 
important: (a) the conditions of international agricultural trade, (b) the dissemination of 
agricultural technology and (c) the implementation of functioning incentive structures. We can 
boost or doom worldwide agricultural productivity, depending on what we will do with trade 
restrictions and food subsidies. We can speed up or slow down agricultural modernization, 
depending on what we do with the results of agricultural research and development; and we can 
block farmers' initiative or encourage their entrepreneurial spirit, depending on how we arrange 
property rights, taxation, price mechanisms, access to modern agricultural inputs, and education. 
The earth's carrying capacity not only depends on natural conditions and technology, it is also 
a function of specific economic arrangements. 
(5 )  Social, cultural and political conditions: Some people believe that we just have to provide 
land, tractors, high-yield seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, agricultural training and free markets 
to  make a person a highly efficient farmer. This technocratic approach, however, ignores the 
social nature of man. We must realize that probably the most serious restrictions for maximal 
utilization of the earth's population carrying capacity have nothing to do with natural resources 
or technology, but stem from social, political and cultural conditions. 
Social and cultural constraints which prevent optimal land utilization can be found not only 
among traditional food collectors, hunters and cattle rangers of Africa and Asia. In many 
societies we have political and social conditions which hinder the farmers to fully exploit the 
carrying capacity of their land. In some cases these restrictions are  voluntary and based on 
ecological considerations. For instance, a growing number of European farmers and agricultural 
politicians have realized that maximizing food production by means of agrochemistry and 
mechanization cannot be the ultimate goal of agriculture. They begin to exclude land from 
cultivation in order to make it available for natural reservations or recreational purposes. 
However, this noble self-restriction of agriculture (which is facilitated by substantial government 
subsidies) is rather atypical. Usually, there are other, more nasty socio-cultural and political 
constraints. Many farmers throughout the world are working their fields in the midst of (civil) 
wars; suffer from lack of technology and modern inputs; or are  restricted by ridiculously low 
producer prices or market regulations. They are forced into collectivization by fanatical 
bureaucrats; and their children are deprived of adequate education and training. These kinds of 
socio-cultural and political constraints probably restrict the carrying capacity of the earth much 
more than anything else. 
To  the knowledge of the author there is no estimate of carrying capacity which takes into 
account all five kinds of restrictions. Usually, the concept is defined in terms of natural resources 
available for food production on a given level of agricultural technology. This reflects widespread 
ignorance of the actual factors that limit food, which are economic, social, cultural, and political. 
In the next section we will examine the multiple dimensions of the earth's carrying capacity in 
greater detail. 
3. NATURAL RESOURCES 
According to our "tube concept" of carrying capacity, natural conditions (such as the globe's solar 
radiation input) and basic biochemical processes (such as photosynthesis) ultimately determine 
the earth's food production potential. If we could transform the total solar energy input of the 
earth into biomass--and if we could eat this biomass--we could probably feed one thousand 
billion people. But this is just a theoretical exercise (which will be discussed later). For all 
practical purposes we have to consider real agroclimatic conditions. There are four natural 
resources and conditions that might directly limit the globe's carrying capacity: land, water, 
climate, and fossil energy. 
3.1. Land 
Since the beginning of the debate on the globe's carrying capacity, it was usually the factor "land" 
which was considered a limitation for the increase of food production. The world's land area is, 
undoubtedly, limited and only a small proportion is suitable for agriculture. Many physical and 
chemical constraints restrict the arable area--some land is too steep or too shallow, other areas 
have drainage or tillage problems. There are serious constraints of soil fertility, such as low 
nutrient retention capacity, aluminum toxicity, phosphorus fixation hazards, low potassium 
reserves or excess of salts or sodium. Both in its 1990-91 and 1992-93 reports on "World 
Resources" the World Resources Institute (WRI) published detailed estimates of these physical 
and chemical soil constraints by climatic class for major regions and on a country-by-country 
basis.22 The estimates are based on a complex methodology, which combines 
- the "Fertility Capability Classification System" (FCC) developed by the North Carolina 
State University," 
- agroclimatic data from FAO's "Agro-Ecological Zones Project,"" and 
- the "FAO/UNESCO Soil Map of the World." 
The estimates--as published by the World Resources Institute in its 1992-93 report--are shocking: 
The most seriously handicapped region is Southeast Asia: more than 93 percent of the soils have 
physical or chemical constraints. The situation is not much better in Southwest Asia: only 12 
percent of the soils are free of inherent fertility constraints. In South America 80 percent and 
in Africa 82 percent of the soils have constraints. Only Central America is a little better: "only" 
73 percent of the soils are hampered by physical or chemical  restriction^.^^ On a 
country-by-country basis the estimates are even more dramatic: For India, WRI reports just 33.2 
22 In the following discussion we only use the most recent estimates from the 1992-93 report. 
Sanches, PA., Couto, W., and Buol, S.W. (1982): The fertility capability soil classification system. 
Interpretation, applicability and modification. Geodema 27283-309 
" Report on the ApEcological Zones Projecf, Vol. 1: Methodology and Results for Africa. World Soil 
Resources Report 4811, Rome (FAO), 1978; Vol. 2: Results for Southwest Asia. World Soil Resources 
Report 4812, Rome (FAO), 1978; Vol. 3: Methodology and Results for South and Central America. World 
Soil Resources Report 4813, Rome (FAO), 1981; Vol. 4: Results for Southeast Asia. World Soil Resources 
Report 4814, Rome (FAO) 1980 
* These are data from the 1992-93 report of the WRI. The estimates of soil constraints in the 1990-91 
Report were even higher for most countries. See: The World Resources InstituteIThe United Nations 
Environment Programme/The United Nations Development Programme (1990): World Resouxes, 1990-91. 
New York, Odord (Odord University Press), pp. 286-287 
million hectares of unconstrained soils; this would be equivalent to 0.04 hectares (or 400 square 
meters) (!) per person. Bangladesh's unconstrained soil resources would be even less: only 0.02 
hectares per person. Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia would have 0.4 to 0.6 hectares per 
person of soil without inherent physical or chemical constraints (see Table 1). 
What do these statistics indicate? The WRI thinks that "the extent of land with soil constraints 
is an important indicator of agricultural costs, thepotential and success offuture expansion [italics 
by the author], and the comparative advantage of a nation's agricultural prod~ction."'~ And later 
the WRI explains that "in the past 10 years, the FCC system has proven a meaningful tool for 
describing fertility limitations on crop yields."" In other words, do the estimates indicate that 
we are  already short of fertile soils for future expansion of food production? 
Not at all! First, one has to read the tiny footnotes attached to the WRI tables. Here we can find 
a few hints that explain what is actually meant by the various soil constraints. It turns out that 
most of the so-called "constraints" are just specific naturul conditions that can be more or less 
easily overcome by modern agricultural technology. Consider the case of soils with "low 
potassium reserves" which constrain crops because of potassium deficiency. There is a simple 
solution: throw potassium fertilizer on it! Another example of soil constraints are "steep slopes" 
or "drainage problems". Would one think that many of these soils can be found in the extremely 
productive paddy rice and wheat areas of Asia, where agriculture is sometimes practiced for 
more than 8000 years (as in China)? "Aluminum toxicity" is also one of these so-called 
constraints that turns out to be less dramatic than its name: it limits the growth of common 
crops, "unless lime is appliedMB--a practice that should not be completely impossible. 
There are, of course, serious soil constraints that cannot be overcome by technology, but the 
WRI data do not distinguish between these and simple problems of soil management. For 
thousands of years farmers have coped with soils that were not perfect. They built terraces, 
added (natural) fertilizers, irrigated or drained the soil. But this did not hinder them to supply 
some of the most prominent empires of history, such as the Dynasties of China or the Kingdoms 
of ancient Egypt. 
hid.,  p. 289 
hid .  
The World Resources Institute/The United Nations Environment ProgrammelThe United Nations 
Development Programme (1992): op. cir., p. 284 
Table 1. Cropland in percent of land without soil constraints: 25 highest and lowest. 
Country 
Lesotho 
Malaysia 
Lao PDR 
Thailand 
Burundi 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Syrian Arab Rep 
Viet Nam 
Uganda 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Lebanon 
India 
Cote d'lvoire 
Brazil 
Togo 
Cambodia 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Cuba 
Land 
Without Soil Cropland in O/O 
Population Land Area Cropland Constraints of Land Without 
in 1000 in 1000 Ha in 1000 Ha in 1000 Ha Soil Constraints 
1989 1989 1989 1989 1 989 
1 724 3035 320 1 32000.0 
8451 32855 4880 196 2489.8 
4024 23080 901 37 2435.1 
54857 51 089 22126 983 2250.9 
5315 2565 1336 66 2024.2 
1069 1 85 106 7 151 4.3 
6994 2467 1153 91 1267.0 
4049 71 62 1801 187 963.1 
12085 18406 5503 643 855.8 
65276 32549 6600 989 667.3 
18118 19955 6705 1210 554.1 
1 12548 1301 7 9292 1719 540.5 
4493 1 1 062 1860 360 51 6.7 
2694 1 023 301 59 51 0.2 
835610 297319 168990 33232 508.5 
11552 31 800 3660 730 501.4 
147283 845651 78650 17081 460.5 
3424 5439 1 444 319 452.7 
8044 17652 3056 695 439.7 
10501 5 91 077 31 335 7797 401.9 
1 18476 77088 20730 5250 394.9 
10500 10982 3329 888 374.9 
Cameroon 1 1 453 46540 7008 1 949 359.6 
Ethiopia 47942 110100 13930 30079 46.3 
Mexico 
Kenya 
Argentina 
Botswana 
Sudan 
Peru 
Somalia 
Bolivia 
Uruguay 
Kuwait 
Egypt 
Chad 
Niger 
Namibia 
Mali 
Libya 
Saudi Arabia 
Yemen, PDR 
Oman 
United Arab Emirates 
Albania 
Mauritania 
There is a second reason why the WRI data on soil constraints are worthless as indicators of the 
earth's carrying capacity: they do not match with current trends in food production. Or to be 
more precise: in some cases the indicators are just absurd when compared with agricultural 
performance--for instance, India. According to the WRI the continent-size nation has only 33.2 
million hectares of internally unconstrained soils; but F A 0  reports that India's farmers are 
cultivating some 169 million hectares of cropland, which is five times the area of "unconstrained 
soils".29 In other words, according to WRI most of India's farmers are producing on more or 
less marginal land, which should limit crop yields. But just the opposite happened during the past 
30 years. Between 1961 and 1989 India's farmers increased cereal production by a spectacular 
129 percent (from 87,376 to 199,816 thousand tons). They also increased cereal yields from 947 
to 1921 kg per hectare area harvested. In Thailand just 983 thousand hectare are free of soil 
constraints, according to WRI data. It seems strange that the country's farmers actually cultivated 
22.1 million hectares of cropland--nearly 23 times the area of the unconstrained soils. Only the 
rice area harvested was 10 times (!) the size of the unconstrained soils area. Thailand's farmers 
also managed to increase cereal production by 131 percent between 1961 and 1989. Most absurd 
are the estimates of soil constraints for Malaysia: According to WRI data only 0.6 percent (or 
196 thousand hectares) of the country's land area is covered by unconstrained soils. Obviously 
this did not much affect the country's farmers, who cultivated 4.9 million (!) hectares of cropland 
in 1989-25 times the area of unconstrained soils. It also did not affect their productivity, since 
they managed to increase cereal production by 62 percent between 1961 and 1989. These are 
only a few examples. We can find a large number of countries where the farmers expanded 
cultivation far into the area of constrained soils, while at the same time substantially increased 
crop yields. 
And there is a third reason why WRI's soil data have limited relevance in our context: a high 
percentage of unconstrained soils in a country does not correlate with good agricultural 
performance. Consider the following example: according to the WRI, Chad has one of the largest 
areas of excellent soils--34.2 million hectares have no inherent physical or chemical constraints, 
an opulent 6.2 hectare per person. Is it not strange that the farmers use less than 10 percent of 
this area for cultivation and that famines are notorious in a place with one of the largest per 
capita resources of first-rate soils? This is not just an isolated case: According to WRI data, 
nearly all typical famine countries of Africa (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Mali) have huge areas 
of top-rated soils which are many times the size of their actual cropland. 
Given these examples it is obvious that other factors than soil quality were responsible for 
agricultural performance during the past three decades. There is simply no correlation between 
food production and soil constraints as being reported by the WRI. Why should we expect that 
this will be different in the future? 
On the other hand we have a large number of agricultural techniques available that could either 
help to expand the arable land and increase yields on marginal soils or improve the overall 
efficiency of crop production: 
(1) We could expand the area of multiple harvests. In many places farmers could use their land 
several times during a growing season instead of only once or twice. Modern seeds, 
advanced agricultural technology, artificial fertilizers and other agricultural inputs have 
made these techniques of multi-cropping possible. It is a myth that we are already 
overutilizing the world's arable land. This is only true in some European and Asian regions. 
In large parts of Latin America and Africa we find excellent soils which are still cultivated 
-- 
29 Cropland = arable land plus land under permanent crops 
with most primitive agricultural technology. Crop yields are often 60 to 90 percent below 
the average European level. Better inputs and modern agricultural methods could 
substantially expand the area of multiple harvesrs. 
(2) We could cultivate marginal land. The farmers can expand the production areas to regions 
that were previously unsuitable for agriculture. There is still plenty of dry land that could 
be irrigated, swamps that could be drained, steep hills which could be terraced. We can 
cover land with glasshouses in cold regions or  use forests for multi-layer cultivation. It is 
also possible to convert shallow seas into agricultural land. The  Netherlands have 
demonstrated that even in adverse climate one can produce more than enough (tropical) 
fruits and vegetables on artificially climatized and drained land. In most countries it was 
not necessary to increase arable land during the past decades, but some agricultures have 
demonstrated that spectacular growth rates are still possible. Libya, for instance, has 
converted desert into circles of irrigated cropland; between 1961 and 1989 its area of 
irrigated agriculture nearly doubled (from 121,000 to 242,000 ha).jO Burundi, which is 
already densely populated, managed to increase its arable land from 765,000 to 1,120,000 
ha and the area of irrigated agriculture from 3,000 to 72,000 ha, respectively. Tanzania 
nearly doubled its arable land and increased the irrigated agriculture more than seven 
times. There are still spectacular land reserves in parts of Africa and Latin America. 
(3) We can expand food production areas to the water bodies of our globe--lakes, rivers and 
seas?' While there is certainly a danger of exploiting the natural fish population of the 
sea, we have just started to explore the potential of fish farming. There is already some fish 
farming at the northern coast of England, in Norwegian fjords and Chinese paddy rice 
fields. A significant proportion of Europe's salmon supply is produced in fish farms near 
the Shetland Islands. But these are still small production sites compared with the huge 
coastal zones of our continents. It was argued that large-scale fish-farming schemes might 
disturb the natural balance of the maritime ecosystem, which, in turn, could limit its 
production p~ ten t ia l .~ '  While there is certainly a risk of local sea pollution through intense 
fish production it is rather unlikely that this might affect the whole ecosystem. 
The early writers thought that a given plot of land can only feed a fixed number of people. Later, 
scientists realized that it is not only the size and natural quality of the land, but mainly the level 
of agricultural technology which determines the land's food production capacity. This basic 
understanding is still rare among today's environmental doomsayers, such as the World 
Resources Institute. They continue to focus their attention to the physical conditions of soils, 
collecting ever more detailed inventories of soil characteristics. But they are obviously blind to 
the fact that it is less and less these characteristics which are relevant. The size and quality of 
soils are just two variables in a multi-term equation of agricultural productivity which is mainly 
determined by technological, economic, social-cultural and political factors. 
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32. Water 
Some experts have argued that it is not land, but water which is the critical resource for the 
global carrying capacity.33 Other scientists consider this a false alarm. We should not confuse--so 
they argue--man-induced regional water shortages with (climate-related) resource s c a r ~ i t y . ~  The 
discussion is hot, but frequently lacks solid ground, since basic data are often simply not 
available. For reasons of space, only some of the arguments will be discussed here. 
Globally around 70% of all water withdrawal is used in agriculture. This explains why the water 
situation is, in fact, important to the earth's food production capacity. And there are also good 
reasons for raising alarm: Available statistics confirm that in some river basins freshwater is 
being extracted for human use (including agriculture) at rates approaching those at which the 
supply is renewed. Especially Egypt is on the brink of a water crisis. The country's renewable 
freshwater resources include some 58.3 km3, of which 56.5 km3 are from the Nile's annual flow 
and 1.8 km3 from other internal renewable resources. 97 percent of these resources (or 56.4 km3) 
are already withdrawn. Egypt's agriculture needs most: 49.6 km3. Only 2.8 km3 are used in the 
industry, and the withdrawal for domestic purposes is about 3.9 km3. 
Libya's agriculture might be also limited by extreme water shortage. According to recent 
estimates the country has a renewable freshwater resource of some 0.7 km3 per year, mostly from 
underground aquifers. Libya's annual withdrawal, however, is estimated at about 2.83 km3 which 
is four times the rate of natural replacement. 75 percent of this unsustainable withdrawal is used 
in agriculture. The country's spectacular increase of grain production is obviously borrowed from 
future generations. 
Another interesting case is Saudi Arabia. Since 1961 the desert country has increased its wheat 
production by a spectacular 4706 percent, from merely 85,000 to 4,000,000 metric tons. Today, 
the country's farmers are not only able to provide more than 35 percent of the domestic food 
supply, which is a spectacular achievement in itself--they actually produce more grain than the 
country would need. In 1991 Saudi Arabia's net export of wheat was 1,805,000 metric tons--as 
compared to a net import of 67,600 metric tons in 1974. Ecologists have argued that the bumper 
harvests were mainly achieved by exploiting fossil--that is non-renewable-water resources below 
the desert. They estimated that in 1988 the country withdrew some 20.5 km3 of water, 90 percent 
from non-renewable fossil groundwater aquifers. They also estimated that Saudi Arabia's 
agriculture needed 90 percent of the water--with 35 percent of the agricultural water 
consumption being used in wheat production. According to the Middle East Economic Digest 
(which cites a confidential U.S. government agency report), at the current rate of depletion Saudi 
Arabia's fossil groundwater would be exhausted by 2007.jS Many writers have argued that Africa 
is a parched ~ont inent?~ The most pessimistic position is probably held by Falkenmark, who 
argues that "water scarcity now threatens two-thirds of the African population?' She thinks that 
RiviCre, J.W.M. (1989): Threats to the world's water. ScientificAmerican, Special Issue: Managing Planet 
Earth 261(3):48-55 
Bandyopadhyay, J. (1989): Riskful confusion of drought and man-induced water scarcity. Ambio 
18(5):284-292 
"Hopes dry up for food security." Middle East Economic Digest 33(40):15, 1989 
Pearce, F. (1991): Africa at a watershed. New Scientist, March 23, pp. 34-40 
" Ibid., p. 35 
already by the year 2000, Tunesia, Kenya, Malawi, Burundi and Rwanda will suffer a permanent 
water crisis. 
There is also much concern about the arid regions of the North China plain. According to recent 
calculations by the World Resources Institute, the 200 million local population is already 
exploiting freshwater resources to a large extent. The institute concludes that "if present trends 
continue, the region will have 6 percent less water than needed by the end of the ~entury."~'  
These few examples certainly seem to confirm the conclusion that water is a critical factor for 
limiting global carrying capacity. But there is also empirical evidence which does not fit into the 
pessimistic outlook. 
Let us first check some global statistics. According to the most recent estimate, the earth's total 
annual freshwater resource is some 40,673 km3. The annual agricultural withdrawal is about 2,236 
km3, which is less than 6 percent of the globe's renewable water. Worldwide industrial and 
domestic water consumption together accounted for another 995 km3 (or just 2.5 percent of the 
total water resource).j9 It is hard to imagine that we are approaching global limits of freshwater 
withdrawal when more than 92 percent of the known reserves are still untouched. 
If there is no scarcity on the global level, the uneven regional distribution of the resource might 
be the problem. Africa is frequently considered an example of agricultural stagnation triggered, 
or  at least intensified, by water scarcity.40 But available statistics do not confirm this theory. 
Africa has 4,184 km3 of annual internal renewable water resources, which was nearly 6500 m3 per 
person per year in 1990. This is almost five times the per capita freshwater availability of West 
Germany, which was only 1300 m3. Moreover, Africa's freshwater is not only located in the 
tropical areas, a s  one might suspect--there are  large reserves all over the continent. Famine 
ridden Somalia has more than twice (!) the per capita internal4' freshwater resource of the 
Netherlands (1520 versus 680 m3). The "arid" Chad has internal freshwater sources of 6760 m3 
per person--more than three times the per capita water resource of the rainy United Kingdom 
(which is only 21 10 m3). And in Angola there are 15,770 m3 of freshwater for each person--nearly 
28 times more than, for instance, in Hungary, which has just 570 m3 available. There is also more 
than enough freshwater in South America: The total resource is estimated at 10,377 km3 which 
is equivalent to the combined renewable water resources of Europe, the whole (former) Soviet 
Union, and Africa. O n  average, each inhabitant of South America has potential access to 34,960 
m3 of freshwater, which is 7.5 times more than in Europe. All large South American nations have 
abundant per capita freshwater resources--ranging from 18,860 m3 in Uruguay to 43,370 m3 in 
Venezuela (which is many times the typical ratio for Europe, Asia or  the USA). Only Peru is 
The World Resources InstituteIThe United Nations Environment ProgrammeIThe United Nations 
Development Programme (1992): op. cit., p. 163 
j9 The World Resources Institute/'The United Nations Environment ProgrammeIThe United Nations 
Development Programme (1992): op. cit., p. 328 
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" River flows from other countries are an unreliable source of water supply, since they can be influenced 
by the neighboring country. Therefore we compare only "annual internal renewable water resources", such 
as underground aquifers. 
somewhat "shorter" in freshwater: 1,790 m3 per person are available--a still abundant amount, 
however, if compared to the 850 m3 of Belgium's internal renewable water resource. The 
situation in North and Central America is mixed--very large resources in Canada, more limited 
resources on the Caribbean Islands. However, there is no indication that freshwater resources 
are running out in the region. Mexico, for instance, has larger internal freshwater resources than 
Italy: 4,030 versus 3,130 m3 per person per year. The freshwater resources of Asian countries are 
also very different: On a national level China has enough water: 2,470 m3 per person per year?2 
India, Pakistan, and Thailand have a little less (2,170, 2,430 and 1,970 m3 per person per year), 
but are far from critical. There is abundant freshwater in Indonesia (14,020 m3), Bangladesh 
(11,740 m3), and Malaysia (2,630 m3). 
An interesting indicator of water stress is the proportion of annual withdrawals from available 
resources (see Table 2). In 51 countries the annual withdrawals are just 1 (or less than 1) percent 
of the renewable freshwater resources, including populous nations such as Indonesia, Brazil, or 
Nigeria. China uses 16 percent of its annual freshwater resource, India 18 percent, Kenya just 
7 percent. In all of Africa, including the drought-affected Sahel, only three countries extract more 
than 50 percent of their annual freshwater resource, namely Egypt (go%), Libya (404%) and 
Tunesia (53%). Most African countries are extracting less than 3 percent of their resources. In 
South America the highest extraction is reported from Peru: a mere 15 percent. All other South 
American nations have not even touched their renewable water reserves--they use typically less 
than 2 percent. Even in Asia, where the situation is a little tighter, extraction rates typically range 
between 1 and 30 percent. Only Afghanistan, Israel, and Cyprus have extraction rates of more 
than 50 percent. For these countries the situation is certainly serious. Jordan, Algeria and 
Tunesia are also critical. The real "dramatic" cases, however, are only a small number of states 
of the Arabian Peninsula: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. They are all 
withdrawing water at much higher rates than those at which their resource is renewed. 
It is also important to understand that human water use is essentially a recycling process: 
frequently water is just moved through biological and technical systems for cleaning or as some 
kind of biological catalyst. Much of the freshwater withdrawal (especially in agriculture) is not 
consumed, but directly returned to a river or underground aquifer. From there it can be used 
several times before it finally reaches the sea. We usually do not consume water in the same way 
as we exploit fossil fuels or scarce minerals. These natural resources have a much lower recycling 
rate than water--they are actually destroyed or at least removed from natural cycles for a very 
long time through human consumption. Consumptive use of water, such as the evaporation from 
industrial cooling towers and irrigation systems, makes up only a small proportion of water 
withdrawal. The real water problem is not scarcity, but the pollution we add to the returning 
flows. 
On the basis of these considerations we cannot see water scarcity as a limitation for the globe's 
carrying capacity. No doubt, there are nations with rather limited resources. We also have local 
or regional shortages that will require expensive water infrastructures. But really dramatic 
shortages can only be found in a small number of desert states of North Africa and Western 
Asia. Most of these countries are enormously wealthy oil exporters and could artificially 
"produce" water for their high-tech agriculture--in fact this is what they are doing with the highest 
density of desalination plants in the world. But is this natural water scarcity of some oil 
billionaires really worth the concern? 
'' The situation within this continent-like country is, however, different. There is water scarcity in the 
northeastern agricultural areas. 
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In principle, water scarcity is not a limiting factor for the further increase of food production. 
It might be difficult and costly to pump freshwater to agricultural areas (such as from the 
northern United States to southern California); it might be necessary to settle conflicts over 
limited water resources between neighboring countries (such as Israel and Lebanon); some 
islands (such as Malta) and some densely populated agricultural regions (such as northern 
China) might require the implementation of advanced water conservation and recycling schemes. 
But all this is not impossible and it is not being done for the first time in history. We tend to 
forget that highly sophisticated irrigation systems were built in the Middle East some four to five 
thousand years ago, and that during the Roman Empire the capital city could flourish only 
because it was supplied with water through aqueducts across hundreds of  mile^.^ 
One reason for concern, however, is the pollution we add to  the returning water flows. Both 
industries and private households have already caused serious local o r  regional water 
contamination. Unfortunately, high-tech agriculture itself is a major polluter of groundwater and 
river In some intensively-cultivated agricultural areas of Europe, the excessive use of 
fertilizers has raised the nitrate concentration in groundwater to dangerously high levels. We also 
can observe pesticide contamination of freshwater resources in some areas of North America 
and E ~ r o p e ? ' ' ~  An increase of food production could easily lead to  further deterioration of 
water resources. 
On the other hand this trend is not inevitable. All experts agree that there is still a huge 
potential for improving the efficiency of fertilizer use, irrigation, water treatment and 
recycling?' Much has already been done to clean lakes and rivers in Europe. Twenty-five years 
ago the lakes in southern Germany frequently had to be closed to swimmers because of pollution 
with coli bacteria. Today one could drink the water while swimming in these lakes. European 
farmers have also realized the danger of over-fertilization. Contrary to  popular belief they use 
less nitrogen fertilizers per ha of arable land than they used 15 years ago. W e  also observe rapid 
development of technologies that could help in cases of real water shortages. Prices for the 
desalination of water are declining rapidly as larger plants with better technology are set 
33. Climate 
The globe's food production potential certainly depends on the climate. The  annual fluxes of 
precipitation and evapotranspiration which determine the potential water supply available for 
human exploitation (so-called run-off) vary greatly by region. They are much higher a t  the 
" Meybeck, M., Chapman, D., and Helmer, R. (1990): Global Environment Monitoring System: Global 
Freshwater Qualiq. A First Assessment. WHO/UNEP. Cambridge, Mass. (Blackwell Reference) 
44 Biswas, A.K. (1993): Water for agricultural development: Opportunities and constraints. Water 
Resources Development 9(1):3-12 
45 Hallberg, G.R. (1989): Pesticides pollution of groundwater in the humid United States. Agiculture, 
Ecosystems and Environment 23299-367 
Leistra, M. and Boesten, J. (1989): Pesticides contamination of groundwater in Western Europe. 
Agiculture, Ecosyslems and Environment 26:369-389 
47 Biswas, A.K. and Arar, A. (1988): Treatment and Reuse of Wastewater. London (Butterworths) 
Wangnick, K. (1990): IDA Worldwide Desalting Plants Inventory. Report No. 11, prepared for the 
International Desalination Association (Wangnick Consulting), Gnarrenburg, Germany 
equator than in the  arid o r  semi-arid regions around the latitudes of 40" north o r  30" ~ 0 ~ 1 t h . ~ ~  
The  vast deserts and arid lands of Asia and Africa that have emerged as  a result of these climate 
conditions a r e  certainly among the  most hostile environments for agriculture on earth. The 
lowest precipitation and evapotranspiration--and consequently the lowest potential water supply 
for human exploitation--can be  found at  the poles. 
The  spatial pattern of the global water cycle not only influences the water supply for rainfed 
agriculture; it also determines variations in the flux of solar radiation energy, which is the fuel 
of photosynthesis, the basic process of plant growth. In the arid or semi-arid mid-latitudes of low 
precipitation, cloud cover is rare o r  absent so that less solar radiation is absorbed o r  reflected. 
Consequently, insolation in these regions is some 20 percent higher than a t  the equator where 
one would expect the  highest solar energy fluxa Since there is also a low level of actual 
evaporation in these arid zones, the solar energy input mainly heats up the ground and the air 
which further increases the region's water deficit and worsens environmental conditions for 
agriculture. 
It is not only the (absolute) shortage of water and the high temperatures in arid and semi-arid 
regions that make agriculture difficult or  impossible. There is also the interannual variation in 
precipitation, which is typically three or four times greater than in temperate regions. This high 
climatic variability explains why the desert can move back and forth in an unpredictable temporal 
pattern. During the early 1970s we experienced a global redistribution of rainfall which led to 
the 1970-72 Sahel drought and contributed to widespread famines in the Sahel and Ethiopia. T h e  
bio-climatic zones of the  Sahel moved south and expanded the area of high desertification risk. 
During the 1970s and 1980s many scientists considered desertification-triggered by climate 
variation--one of the major causes of declining food production potential in large parts of Africa 
and Asia. But there is no general consensus. Others reported evidence for a major anthropogenic 
component in the desertification process.51 W e  also have to  take into account that the 
transformation of arid and semi-arid lands to desert during the Sahel drought was (at least 
partially) compensated by higher precipitation north of the Sahara.52 There is still a debate 
whether the total desert area really expanded o r  just shifted southward into densely-populated 
and more intensely-cultivated areas, causing serious famines. There is also evidence that the 
climatic risk of desertification in the arid and semi-arid regions of Africa is amplified by 
unsustainable practices of agriculture, deforestation and cattle ranging in this region. According 
to some, human mismanagement of land resources is the major factor causing desertification of 
Africa's Sahel r e g i ~ n . ~  And finally, climate data show that the drought was not restricted to the  
famine areas of the Sahel. Much higher precipitation anomalies were observed during the same 
* Baumgartner, A. and Reichel, E. (1975): 73e World Water Balance. Amsterdam (Elsevier Scientific 
Publishers) 
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period in Asia and south of the equator. The absence of serious famines in these regions 
indicates that factors other than climate must have caused the great African far nine^.^ 
While climate conditions are certainly major factors restricting the area of profitable agriculture, 
this does not mean that we are  totally dependent. We can grow tropical fruits in cold climates 
or wheat in the desert. W e  can heat or  cool, irrigate or  drain cultures. This is a matter of 
technology, food prices and investment capital. Of course, farmers are still very much dependent 
on natural conditions, such as soils or  climates, but they have also made great steps forward to  
reducing their impact. As will be discussed later, technology is the driving force of this trend. 
3.4. Fossil Energy Input 
Most experts agree that we could boost food production in many developing regions, if we would 
modernize agriculture. Crop yields in Africa and Latin America are frequently 70 to 80 percent 
below the European average. Modern agricultural inputs, such as nitrogenous fertilizers, 
irrigation, pesticides, and agricultural machinery could easily double or  triple the output. With 
modern technology we could also reduce after-harvest losses, which are substantial in many 
developing countries." This modernization, however, is linked to  one basic factor: commercial 
energy. Therefore, some scientists have argued that (fossil) energy is the limiting factor for the 
global carrying capacity.% 
However, available statistics and research on energy consumption in agriculture give no 
indication that fossil energy will be a limiting factor for agricultural modernization. Contrary to 
widespread belief, modern agriculture does not consume large amounts of commercial energy. 
On  average, just 3 percent of worldwide fossil energy consumption is used in agriculture--and less 
than 1 percent (!) is needed for the production of (nitrogenous) fertilizers." Most likely more 
fossil energy is needed to fly the doomsday advocates of the global food problem to their many 
international conferences than it would cost to produce adequate amounts of crop nutrients, 
pesticides and fungicides for the stagnating agricultures in Africa and Latin America. 
Some critics have rejected agricultural modernization as an option for increasing global food 
production on the basis of its supposedly high consumption of fossil energy. They obviously 
misunderstood energy statistics which indicate that some 70 to 80 percent of all commercial 
energy is used in the food sector. While these numbers might certainly be correct, they only 
indicate the overall fossil energy consumption in human food chains. Most of this energy, 
however, is not spent in agriculture, but used for packaging, cleaning, transport, conservation, 
bottling, canning, refrigeration and preparation of food. As the author has demonstrated 
" Lamb, H.H. (1982): Climate, History and the Modem World. London (Methuen) 
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elsewheres we spend enormous amounts of fossil energy for post-harvest processing of food 
and for running a most energy-consuming international food distribution network. We have 
accepted that, for instance, French or Austrian (mineral) water is bottled and shipped to the 
United States of America or Australia--completely unaware that a huge amount of fossil energy 
is needed to produce the bottles and ship the water halfway around the globe. Most of the 
energy consumption in the food sector has nothing to do with agriculture, but with lifestyles, 
trade regulations, state subsidies, or marketing strategies. If we would discontinue only the most 
irrational practices in the food processing and distribution sector, we could save much more fossil 
energy than is needed for the modernization of agricultures in developing countries. 
35. Conclusion: Are the Natural Resources Limited? 
If we take into account the creative potential of man, there is no foreseeable limitation to the 
basic natural resources of food production, which are space, water, climate conditions, solar 
energy, and man-made inputs. All these resources are either unlimited for all practical purposes, 
or can be expanded, better utilized, or redesigned to a very large extent. This might be the 
reason why several experts have denied any upper limit for population growth. The notion of 
"physical limits to growth" is a faulty concept--it makes it easy for agricultural technocrats to deny 
any basic problems in boosting the world food supply. We have to find better arguments to 
convince people that global food production may be limited. 
4. TECHNICAL LIMITATIONS AND CHANCES 
Technology is certainly one of the most important determinants of the earth's carrying capacity. 
If the human race would have failed to invent agriculture some 10 thousand years ago, only a 
few million people could have survived on this planet as hunters and gatherers. Cut-and-burn 
agriculture, the next step in the evolution of human sustenance, lifted the carrying capacity to 
at least twice or three times the level of primitive food  collector^.'^ The invention of soil 
cultivation and animal husbandry in stable settlements, which was the first agricultural revolution, 
set the ground for the big empires at the Nile, Euphrates, Tigris and along the great Asian rivers. 
Since World War 11, the second, chemotechnological, revolution of agriculture has established 
a new level of sustenance. We are certainly capable of producing enough food for 5 to 6 billion 
people--in fact we are facing severe problems of over-production. Now the important question 
is whether technologies will be available that could further lift the earth's carrying capacity? And 
what are the restrictions and risks for their implementation? 
4.1. Chances 
Despite nearly hysterical criticism by some scholars, only the application of modern technology 
to agriculture will provide the necessary tools for increasing the earth's carrying capacity. Of 
course, we are not talking about a simple-minded, high-input agriculture which--for the sake of 
short-term increase of yields--would degrade soils, pollute groundwater or harm the environment 
in some other way. We are talking about the numerous technical options that could improve 
yields, while at the same time reducing the environmental impact of agriculture. In general these 
" Heilig, G. (1993): Food, lifestyles, and energy. Pages 60-86 in D.G. van der Heij, ed. Food and Nutition 
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technical options would be targeted to improve energy and water efficiency, re-fertilize exhausted 
soils, or minimize pesticide application. They would optimize crop rotation, adapt cultivation 
methods to local soil conditions, or prevent adverse effects of large-scale irrigation. 
4.1.1. Imgation 
One possibility for increasing the earth's food production capacity is the expansion of irrigation. 
However, since two-thirds of the global freshwater withdrawal is already used in agriculture, it 
would be essential to implement only those technologies that improve irrigation efficiency, 
reduce water loss, and prevent environmental damage in irrigation schemes. Fortunately, there 
are techniques available that could achieve these objectives. We cannot go into detail but will just 
list a few options that are considered rather promising by agricultural experts." 
(a) An obvious technical option is the conservation of existing water resources (rather than the 
exploitation of new ones). In most irrigation schemes efficiency is incredible low--usually 
less than 25 percent of the applied water is consumed by the plants. In the United States 
it was possible to double water use efficiency by relatively simple means, such as laser land 
leveling and automatic pulsed water application. 
(b) Run-off control, cleaning, and recycling of agricultural wastewater could also contribute to 
the conservation of existing water resources. 
(c) A modification of cropping practices could save water or increase yields with available 
resources. For instance, farmers could switch to crops that can be grown during seasons of 
lower climatic water demand, which are the cooler and more humid seasons of the year. 
This simple measure could increase yields per unit of water by up to 50 percent. By 
carefully timing the planting dates, substantial yield increases are possible. 
(d) Insufficient leaching61 is one of the most serious dangers in irrigation agriculture. To avoid 
problems farmers tend to apply much more water to their irrigated fields than would be 
necessary. This frequently results in serious soil damage and has already destroyed large 
irrigation areas. Agricultural science and technology could prevent this imgation 
mirmanagement. There are methods for precise calculation and application of the water 
amount needed for leaching requirements, which take into account soil salinity and 
evaporation. 
(e) Desertification and soil loss is frequently triggered by the removal of significant areas of 
vegetation cover, through overgrazing, cattle trampling, or deforestation. Intelligent land-use 
practices which avoid phases of total vegetation removal could substantially increase the 
local water availability. Afforestation on water catchment areas would also help to conserve 
the water resources. 
(f) Modern technology could reduce water evaporation losses. The three major sources for 
evaporation of water in agriculture are: water storage and conveyances, irrigation systems, 
and plant evapotranspiration. All three can be reduced by technical means. There are 
several methods for reducing plant transpiration6' but the gains are probably not too big 
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and negative side-effects are  likely. Much, however, could be done t o  reduce evaporation 
in irrigation such as  better timing of water application, trickle irrigation, etc. The 
evaporation from lakes and conveyances could be reduced by removing water plants and 
by building deep, instead of shallow, reservoirs. It was estimated that Lake Nasser, dammed 
by the Aswan high dam, is losing more water by evaporation than it makes available for 
irrigation." 
(g) Water harvesting is also a very attractive technical option to  increase local water resources 
for agriculture. There are  several possibilities: One  can use special kinds of fences at high 
altitude to "milk" water out of clouds, as is being done in some places of the Andes 
mountains. A very cost-efficient method is cloud seeding. Certain chemicals a re  used to 
increase the number of condensation nuclei in the atmosphere which can trigger 
precipitation. 
(h) And finally we can exploit previously neglected sources of water, such as the large bodies 
of brackish water. There are  also great rivers that are  practically unused for irrigation, such 
as  the Shari and Logone rivers in Chad.6" Their combined water flow is comparable to 
Egypt's withdrawal from the Nile. Well-designed irrigation schemes could make the desert 
bloom. 
A s  we have demonstrated above, many arid and semi-arid countries in Africa have vast resources 
of fertile soils. If these countries would be able to apply proper irrigation technology to  these 
lands (such as Israel did under similar climatic conditions) they could increase food production 
by orders of magnitude. 
4.1.2. Breeding, Bio-engineering 
Apart from irrigation there a re  many technological options to boost rainfed agriculture. We have 
just started to  explore the potential of bio-engineering for increasing crop yields6' and livestock 
e f f i c i e n ~ y . ~ ~  In a few years o r  decades the "creation" of new plants by techniques of 
bio-engineering could replace traditional breeding techniques. This would speed up the process 
of adapting animal and plant species to marginal environments such as arid regions o r  wetlands. 
The new techniques could also lead to high-yield food and feed crops which bind nitrogen from 
the air and thus require less input of fertilizers. There is also speculation about bio-engineering 
plants and animals which have a "natural" resistance against many kinds of diseases which would 
reduce the consumption of pesticides and animal medicines. Most experts agree that all this 
could possibly boost food production by orders of magni t~de .~ '  
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Photosynthesis is the complex and still poorly understood biochemical process by which plants 
build up biomass. It is fueled by solar radiation energy, and needs, among other things, 
atmospheric carbon, plant nutrients, and water as inputs. Until today not much could be done 
to increase the overall efficiency of the process--if we forget about artificially C0,-enriched 
atmospheres in glasshouses. However, there is a chance that recent advances in biochemistry and 
plant genetics can somewhat improve the net-efficiency of photosynthesis by reducing the 
respiratory losses of Cora  The gains will probably not be spectacular in food grain, but it is 
possible that animal food with very high photosynthetic efficiency can be bio-engineered. 
4.1.3. Food Processing 
Much can also be done to optimize post-harvest crop processing, drying, transport and storage. 
In some parts of the Third World (such as India) enormous amounts of food and feed crops are 
lost to mice, rats, and fungi. Improper storage and transport frequently causes after-harvest 
losses of up to 40-50 percent. Much can also be done to improve the processing, transport and 
preparation of food. Most people are not aware that some 90 percent of fossil energy use in a 
food chain is linked to non-agricultural activities--only 5 to 10 percent is consumed on the farm. 
Also, if we would reduce meat consumption in Europe and Northern America by a few percent 
we could save enormous amounts of grain. And finally, we could boost the productivity of 
agriculture by optimizing system integration of farms, such as linking energy generation (biogas) 
and livestock production. 
4.1.4. Synthetic Food Production 
Finally, there is the option of synthetic food production. Those who shiver from abhorrence 
about this possibility should think twice. We are already using considerable amounts of artificial 
ingredients in our food. The yeast in our beer and bread is industrially produced in 
bio-converters; citric acid and hundreds of food preservatives are manufactured by the 
biochemical industry.69 The taste of fruit yoghurt is usually a synthetically re-designed and 
enforced "natural" flavor. The colors of meat sausages or fruit juices often come straight from 
the chemical laboratory. In a not-too-distant future it is possible that we will produce "synthetic" 
meat or vegetable protein in cell cultures. If this perspective affects your appetite it is just 
because you are not familiar with what we currently do in slaughter houses or chicken farms all 
over the world. Actually, it might be more humane to feed a 10 or 12 billion world population 
on bio-engineered protein than to breed and kill millions of animals or convert the last natural 
ecosystems into paddy rice fields. 
A big step toward synthetic food production was recently made in Japan, when 12 "lettuce 
factories" started business. They look like high-tech electronic laboratories: the "lettuce farmers" 
wear white gloves and breathing masks. The production sites are so-called "clean roomsw-- 
hermetically isolated and sterilized chambers which prevent the introduction of fungi, insects and 
crop diseases. There is no soil, rainfall or sun. The lettuce is grown on a synthetic fiber, the roots 
are automatically sprayed with fertilizer-enriched water, radiation energy (for photosynthesis) 
is applied by special electric Lights. Lettuce output is ten times that of natural cultivation and 
highly profitable. The taste of this "high-tech" lettuce cannot be distinguished from the naturally 
grown plant. Rash critics might jump to the conclusion that this high-tech production is rather 
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energy-inefficient as compared to conventional cultivation. But this is most likely not the case. 
While more fossil energy is used to control the production environment (heating, lighting, 
irrigation), much less is needed for production of pesticides, fungicides, weed killers, and 
insecticides, because of the sterile growing conditions. Moreover, high-tech cultivation needs 
much less space and can be located close to the consumers, such as in the middle of a city. Thus, 
enormous amounts of fossil energy for transportation, conservation and storage can be saved. 
(Usually, the fossil energy consumption needed for the production of lettuce and other vegetables 
is a small fraction of the energy that is spent in packaging, transportation, and storage of the 
product.) In some Japanese supermarkets lettuce is already produced directly on the spot and 
"harvested" by the sales personnel according to demand. It is very likely that the urban 
agglomerates of the 21st century will be supplied locally with vegetables and fruits. This is not 
science fiction. A large proportion of the tomatoes, cucumbers, zucchini, and eggplant we eat in 
Europe are already produced in a similar way in the high-tech greenhouses of the Netherlands. 
4.2. Limitations 
After reading the previous paragraph one might have the impression that the author considers 
technology the "golden keyn to opening the earth's unlimited resources of food. But this is not 
the case. Agroscience and agrotechnology, of course, have limitations and dangers. 
First, there are unintended side-effects of agricultural technology. Especially the input-oriented, 
large-scale technology of the 1970s and early 1980s has caused many problems, such as soil 
degradation, over-fertilization, salination or water logging in irrigated soils, groundwater pollution 
and toxification of agricultural workers by pesticides, etc. These problems are usually caused by 
lack of know-how, poor management techniques, faulty maintenance of irrigation systems and 
agricultural machinery, or simply by corruption and ignorance. 
Second, we have consequences of agricultural modernization and expansion that were well 
predicted but seem to be inevitable. When farmers transform natural ecosystems into cropland 
or meadows, they inevitably disturb their biological balance. A new, artificial balance has to be 
reestablished. This requires careful planning and proper long-term management of soils, water 
sources, and infrastructure. One of the greatest threats to natural ecosystems--such as the 
tropical rainforests--is the "unconfined cut-down, plant and move" exploitation by poorly trained, 
inexperienced farmers (or ignorant and cynical ago-businesses). 
Third, there is the problem of education and socio-cultural adaptation. It is obvious that not 
every culture and ethnic group is flexible enough to learn new ways of food production. Chinese 
farmers, for instance, quickly adapted to using modern technology when the government 
abandoned many restrictions of the communist economy during the 1970s. Within a few years 
China experienced one of the most spectacular increases in nitrogenous fertilizer consumption 
and tractor use--and a tripling of cereal production. Compare this to Nigeria, the oil-wealthy 
African nation! The country has all the resources (including capital, land, water, and fossil energy 
for fertilizers) to make it the breadbasket of Africa. But the agriculture has stagnated for the last 
three decades. 
And finally, there are enormous costs for implementing a more efficient agricultural technology. 
We are not only talking about the farmers who need investment capital. There is also the need 
for upgrading the general infrastructure. Agricultural modernization requires a steady supply of 
inputs (fertilizers, water for irrigation, crop sanitation products) for which working transportation 
and distribution systems have to be implemented. There are also significant social costs. 
Agricultural modernization inevitably increases the pressures on the rural labor force. Both 
farmers and landless agricultural workers have to adapt to new methods and conditions. They 
must accept retraining and technical education, and there are always groups of the population 
that lack the necessary flexibility for change. It is also very likely that agricultural modernization 
will produce rural unemployment, even if labor-intensive production methods are applied. 
5. ECOLOGICAL LIMITS 
Ecological constraints and feedback mechanisms are frequently considered limiting factors of 
growing food production.70 Currently scientists discuss four types of problems: (1) The 
expansion of agricultural areas and the increase in the catch of fish could destroy large ecological 
systems. This would lead to a reduction of biodiversity in the fauna and flora and diminish the 
global gene pool. (2) The increase of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides, 
weed killers, and other chemicals could pollute groundwater bodies, lakes and seas. It could 
change the chemistry of the soils and speed up soil erosion. (3) Genetically modified plants (and 
animals) could be a danger to the natural environment. And finally (4) a significant increase in 
food production could even change the global climate; emissions of greenhouse gases, such as 
methane, could dramatically increase due to the expansion of livestock and paddy rice 
production. What evidence do we have that these ecological consequences are in fact 
unavoidable? 
5.1. Shrinking of Natural Ecological Systems 
There is little doubt that feeding an ever-growing number of people will further diminish the 
living space of other species. For many kinds of wild animals we will leave only small niches of 
natural ecosystems. This competitive race between man and other living creatures (including 
plants) can probably not be avoided. It seems to be an evolutionary constant. The best we can 
hope for is that we will be able to preserve key natural habitats in order to stop further 
extinction of species. The only realistic protection of the planet's natural "gene pools" and "green 
lungs", such as the Amazonas, is a combination of strictly-managed natural parks and careful 
economic utilization with a minimum of environmental damage. If we want to reserve the 
tropical rainforests exclusively for butterfly catchers, anthropologists and botanists in the face of 
millions of landless hungry farmers, we will have to answer some tough questions on our moral 
standards. 
Food production, however, is not the only activity that tends to diminish natural ecosystems. The 
spread of human settlements, infrastructures and industries must be added to a possible 
expansion of agricultural land. Undoubtedly, the human race is changing the surface of the earth 
with unprecedented speed. 
5.2. Soil Degradation (Acidification, Soil Loss) and Water Pollution 
There are many agricultural practices which can have a destructive impact on the environment. 
Excessive use of fertilizers can contaminate the groundwater; crop monocultures and unsuitable 
tillage practices can aggravate soil erosion; the use of pesticides poses health risks on farm 
workers and the runoff can pollute the groundwater. There are concerns that "artificial" pest and 
weed control can trigger the emergence of resistant animal and plant species, which in turn 
would require the further increase of pesticides. In some parts of Europe we have industrial-size 
livestock production systems which produce enormous amounts of manure. If the manure is not 
properly processed and just spread in large quantities on crop fields and meadows it can run off 
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into rivers and lakes, seep into the groundwater or increase the already existing nitrogen 
overload of the soil. In Africa's pastoral societies overgrazing and trampling by cattle is an 
enormous problem. 
These environmental risks of agriculture are well known and certainly diminish the actual 
carrying capacity of many regions. One of the most recent studies conducted by the International 
Soil Reference and Information Center in Wageningen has estimated that agricultural activities 
have caused moderate to extreme soil degradation of 1.2 billion hectares worldwide--which is 
about the combined size of China and India." This does not mean that the soils are completely 
lost for agriculture, but that their natural fertility is more or less diminished. The impact of 
agriculture on the water is also well documented: Some 25 percent of the population in the 
European Community are already drinking water with a nitrate level greater than the 
recommended maximum of 25 milligrams per liter." Pesticides can be found in the groundwater 
of 34 states of the United States of America. 
These are serious problems of intensive crop and livestock production, but there is no reason 
why we should not be able to solve them. With modern technology, agricultural know-how and 
better agricultural policy, it would be possible to expand food production, while at the same time 
reducing its environmental impact. A good example is Europe's agriculture. Contrary to 
widespread belief the farmers did not just proceed with their practices of over-fertilization and 
mindless use of pesticides (which they in fact had adopted during most of the 1970s and 1980s). 
If the F A 0  statistics are correct the consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers significantly declined 
during the past six or seven years in most European agricultures, while the production increased. 
In all of Europe the consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers fell from some 15.1 in 1983184 to 
about 13.6 million tons in 1990191--a decline of more than 10 percent." In West Germany the 
farmers consumed 1.52 million tons in 1985; four years later consumption was down to 1.48 
million tons.74 The fertilizer input in kg per hectare of cropland fell from 464 to 404 between 
1977179 and 1987/89.7s Modern methods of crop management try to optimize--rather than 
maximize--the input of crop nutrients and pesticides. We also have to take into account that in 
large parts of the Third World, especially in Africa, fertilizer consumption is a small fraction of 
what is typical in Europe or some Asian countries. Even if these farmers would double or triple 
fertilizer consumption they would be far away from the levels that are typical for high input 
agricultures. 
53. Risks of Genetic Engineering and Advanced Breeding Practices 
Previously we have mentioned that genetic engineering could be a great opportunity for 
increasing food production, especially if we could breed drought and pest resistant crops; but it 
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could be also a danger. There was much concern that genetically-manipulated plants and animals 
could "escape" control and drive out other natural species from their habitat. There were also 
several other unintended side effects under discussion. However, recently governments in Europe 
and Northern America have loosened restrictions for field experiments with genetically-modified 
plants. They obviously consider the risks rather low as compared with possible benefits. 
5.4. Climate Change 
In theory, there are two links between climate change and global food production. First, the 
expansion and intensification of agriculture, which is necessary for sustaining the growing world 
population, could be a driving force for global warming. Emissions of methane (CH,), which is 
the third most important greenhouse gas, could increase when livestock and paddy rice areas are  
expanded. (Livestock and paddy rice areas are important sources of anthropogenic methane 
emission to  the a t m ~ s p h e r e . ~ ~ )  And agricultural mechanization could boost CO, emissions. The 
second link between climate change and agriculture works the other way round: there is concern 
that global warming could reduce (or increase) agricultural output. One  of the most detailed 
approaches to  the problem was IIASA's "integrated climate impact assessment" which--for the 
first time--not only analyzed first-order consequences of global warming to  agriculture, but also 
second-order impacts.77 This is not the place to  comment or  analyze this major scientific study, 
but it might be interesting to  note that Parry and Carter are very cautious about the predictive 
validity of their research. In a "Summary of Resultsn they write: 
The estimates reported in this volume are not predictions of future effects [italics by 
Parry/Carter]. Present-day uncertainties and inaccuracies in simulating the behavior 
of the world's climate and in evaluating the agricultural implications of climatic 
change do not permit realistic predictions to be made. Furthermore, we cannot 
forecast what technological, economic and social developments in agriculture will 
occur over the next half century. The estimates should therefore be considered as 
measures of the present-day sensitivity [italics by Parry/Carter] of agriculture to 
climate change.78 
No doubt, there are links between climate and agriculture, but it is also obvious that these links 
are not just simple one-way causations. They work through a complex system of intermediate 
variables, which can modify their strengths and turn them around from positive to  negative (and 
vice versa). The most important intermediate variables are  the availability of advanced 
technology, the existing economic arrangements, the political situation, and the level of education 
and training among the farmers. If farmers have no access to  advanced technology, are  hampered 
by poor education and training, or  are  restricted by stupid economic arrangements, a worsening 
of climate conditions (such as the increase of drought or  unstable precipitation) can seriously 
diminish agricultural output. However, the climate change could also have the opposite effect: 
it could trigger the development of advanced agricultural methods, which in the end are  even 
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more productive. Israeli and Finnish farmers, for instance, have demonstrated that high 
productive agriculture is possible under very harsh--and rather diverse--agroclimatic conditions. 
Our knowledge is too limited to decide whether the projected climate change would reduce 
global carrying capacity. However, we believe that a possible (but by no means certain) global 
warming would be a gradual process, which would give us enough time to adapt the 
socioeconomic framework of agriculture and implement new technologies in order to 
counterbalance its negative effects. 
6. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CARRYING CAPACITY 
For decades the scientific discussion on the food-population nexus has avoided a key issue. While 
scientists spent their time elaborating hypotheses with rather weak empirical evidence (such as 
the "law of diminishing returns") or engaged themselves in intellectual self-gratification by 
building all kinds of complex models of global carrying capacity, they mostly ignored the political, 
social and economic dimension of food production. The news media, however, reported the facts 
on a day-by-day basis: In most cases it was colossal policy failure which has caused widespread 
undernutrition and famine during the past four decades. Agricultural stagnation and food deficits 
were usually unrelated to a shortage of soil, water, rainfall, fossil energy or investment capital. 
They were also unrelated to high population growth. Typically, food crises could be found where 
social, cultural and economic conditions have prevented agricultural modernization, as in large 
parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
There are so many socio-cultural constraints to agricultural modernization that we could dedicate 
the whole paper to this problem. Due to limitation of space we just mention some of the most 
important factors: 
(a) Policy failure: The most serious famines in recent times had nothing to do with population 
pressure, crop failure or natural disasters. They were either (1) directly and intentionally 
triggered by scrupulous regimes as a means for executing their political strategies (as the 
Khmer Rouge did in ~ a m b o d i a ' ~ ' ~ ) ,  (2) accepted as necessary side-effects of coercive 
development measures (as in China's Great Leap Forward during the Mao Tse Tung 
era") or (3) simply emerged from cynical ignorance, because the regimes were more 
interested in other political and military issues (as in most civil wars of Africa from 
Ethiopia to ~omalia) . '~  
(b) False economic policy and corruption: The stagnation of agricultural production in some 
parts of the Third World--especially in Africa south of the Sahara and in parts of Latin 
America--was closely related to the notorious inefficiency, massive corruption, unbelievable 
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incompetence, and ideological blindness of political leaders and their administration. Many 
of these incompetent regimes in Africa simply transplanted the Soviet model of a centrally 
planned command economy to their pre-industrial society. They eliminated traditional 
market mechanisms by fixing food prices on very low levels to appease urban m a s s e ~ . ~  
They collectivized most of the fertile land (as in Ethiopia) and forced the farmers to sell 
their production to state-owned trade agencies for prices that were close to production 
costs (as in Tanzania). The  ideologically legitimized lack of incentives demotivated the 
farmers and prevented agricultural modernization.'" In Latin America military regimes 
stabilized feudalistic rural societies and prevented agricultural modernization. Very often 
these disasters of agricultural policy were joined by a general failure of development policy. 
The political and administrative elites in many developing countries of Africa and Latin 
America did little to modernize infrastructure, neglected technical education and training, 
and blocked industrial modernization. Huge amounts of development aid were wasted on 
expensive but useless prestige projects or  simply vanished to the (Swiss) bank accounts of 
the small ruling class. Even "rich" countries, such as exporters of oil and other natural 
resources (Nigeria), neglected the agricultural sector. 
(c) Social inequality: There is still chronic undernutrition and hunger among certain groups 
of the population in food surplus countries such as India or  Indonesia. However, this kind 
of food problem can also be found in highly developed, affluent societies such as the 
United States of America. It is a problem of distribution and has nothing to do with the 
availability of food. Lack of entitlements to  acquire adequate food in the lowest classes of 
society are  the cause of the problem. The class and cast structure of some societies also 
prevents adequate distribution of agricultural land. 
(d) Development of human resources (health, education): Much land in the Third World 
cannot be cultivated in the most efficient way because the farmers are suffering from 
chronic diseases (malaria, river blindness) or  are hampered by lack of education and 
agricultural know-how. Several studies, for instance, have shown the impact of malaria 
among rural populations on food production.'' A dramatic situation is evolving in parts 
of Africa and Asia (Thailand) because of AIDS. The spread of this disease among rural 
populations in Eastern Africa has already made a measurable impact on food 
p rod~c t ion . '~  
(e) Traditions: There are  many traditions that help people to improve their sustenance. 
Especially agricultural societies have developed numerous rules, habits, taboos and 
traditions to  prevent food crises, maintain soil fertility, or  improve the environment for the 
next generation. Consider the traditional rules of crop-rotation or  the tradition to plant a 
tree on certain occasions. Unfortunately there are  also cultural values that prevent 
agricultural modernization and a full utilization of resources. For instance, in most of 
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Africa agriculture is considered low-prestige women's work. It is part of their household 
duties--in addition to cooking and caring for the children. Whenever a man can afford to 
avoid working in a field, he will do so. This traditional disregard of food production, deeply 
embedded in African men, can be also found in development plans and investment 
decisions of African governments. 
7. DISCUSSION 
We have demonstrated that culture and food are closely related. A society can only develop 
sciences, technology and arts when it has a highly productive system of food supply. As long as 
everyone is busy collecting or hunting food, no real development as we know it is possible. We 
can study this link between development and food in early agricultural societies which emerged 
in the alluvial lowlands and river floodplains of Africa and Asia. These ancient people developed 
complex social and economic systems, which included bureaucratic hierarchies and specialized 
professions. The social differentiation was necessary to solve typical problems of agriculture, such 
as water management or storage administration. The societies also institutionalized mechanisms 
of conflict resolution--for instance, to settle conflicts of water distribution and land ownership-- 
and they developed cognitive systems which helped them to understand and predict the natural 
cycles of floods and rainfalls. They also managed to establish a stable (if not always peaceful) 
relationship with their neighbors. This social and cultural framework was essential for making 
their agriculture prosper and, in turn, the highly productive agriculture propelled the social and 
cultural development. In his many books on Indonesia, Clifford Geertz has studied these 
dialectics of development in an agricultural society." 
In today's traditional societies of hunters, food collectors or cattle rangers the carrying capacity 
of land is not only low, as compared to an agricultural society, because these societies lack 
certain technical means (such as ploughs) and economic structures (such as markets). They also 
lack specific cultural values and social institutions. One of the most serious restrictions which 
hinder the full exploitation of Africa's carrying capacity is embedded into the cultures and 
societies of some of its people. When East African governments tried to turn nomadic cattle 
rangers (such as the Massai in Kenya) into settled farmers they were bound to fail. The world's 
view of this nomadic tribe just did not fit into an agricultural society. This is the tragedy of the 
few remaining endogenous people of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Their existence depends 
on a fixed balance of people and land. They are in a process of losing this balance because of 
two trends: population growth and/or shrinking of their land. 
While the balance of people and food in traditional societies is getting more and more fragile, 
the phenomenon does--of course--not indicate that they are already approaching the (absolute) 
maximum carrying capacity of their land. They have just failed to adapt their culture and mode 
of production to new conditions of population density and/or land availability. In the end, other 
people with better technology and a more flexible social and economic organization will drive 
them out of their environment. One might not like this brutal fight for dominance, but it is 
precisely what is happening to the Indians of the Amazon or to some nomadic tribes in Africa. 
This fight for dominance with the help of (better) technology and more flexible socioeconomic 
arrangements goes on not only between endogenous tribes and majority populations, but also 
between whole nations and continents. The political, social and economic disaster in some 
developing countries of Africa and Latin America is so obvious because it is in such sharp 
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contrast to the roaring success of some developing nations in Asia. Consider the case of China: 
When China's leaders finally abandoned collectivization, when they diminished central planning 
of agriculture and introduced market mechanisms, the food sector began to boom--since the early 
1960s cereal production more than tripled and meat production increased tenfold. In India and 
Indonesia cereal production more than doubled. India, which was notorious for its succession of 
severe famines, achieved self-sufficiency of food during the last decades. Thailand, Malaysia and 
China combined the rapid growth of domestic food production with enormous growth rates in 
other sectors of the economy. Currently China is worrying about its 12 percent annual growth 
rate of the GDP (they are afraid of an "overheating economy"). 
From a system-analytic point of view most studies on carryingcapacity are surprisingly unrealistic 
in their economic and social assumptions. They usually define carrying capacity in terms of direct 
agricultural self-supply as a population supporting capacity of land, given a certain level of 
agricultural technology. This concept might be sufficient to describe traditional rural societies 
which lack strong division of labor, international trade, political organization, science and 
industry. But this concept is inadequate for today's functionally differentiated societies and 
economies. Here the division of labor expands from the household to the national economy and 
the international market. During the last decades Arab nomads in the deserts of Saudi Arabia 
could feed their families quite well from the scarce land by selling the oil resources underneath 
on the world market, for instance, to French farmers who in turn produced a significant 
proportion of their meat supply. 
Today, the supply of food, which once was a simple process of collecting, hunting or 
self-sufficient local agriculture, has evolved into a complex international network of production 
activities, industrial processes, market and price mechanisms, trade arrangements, food policies 
and distribution channels. At each stage of this widely expanded food chain we might find 
conditions that could limit the food supply of a population. It might be a shortage of fertile soils 
or water, adverse climate conditions, or a lack of fossil energy for fertilizer production. But the 
limitation might also arise from widespread analphabetism and a lack of agricultural know-how 
in a population; it could be caused by the persistence of inefficient market structures and 
production regulations; or it might be the consequence of international trade restrictions. 
The carrying capacity of the earth not only depends on its natural resources or the level of 
technology, but essentially on the quality of our worldwide economic, social and political 
arrangements. Land, water, climate and energy are just four parameters in the much more 
complex set of equations for the earth's carrying capacity. These equations must describe the 
world as a system of interdependencies--a system of exchange mechanisms (food trade) and 
complementary production activities, which can counterbalance regional variations in the density 
of natural and human resources. Today, carrying capacity cannot be defined on a purely local 
or regional level. It cannot be calculated from the availability of natural resources. We know that 
the natural supporting potential of land can only be realized if there are educated and trained 
people who can live in peace, who have access to (world) markets, who can use modern 
agricultural and industrial techniques and inputs, and who are not punished and demotivated by 
a centrally-planned command economy. 
8. CONCLUSION 
How many people can be fed on earth ifwe take into account technical, ecological, political, and 
social constraints? Most experts would probably agree that we could sustainably supply the 
current 5.5 billion world population. At the moment European governments are pressing their 
farmers to reduce food production; grain is cheap on international markets, and Asian countries 
are harvesting bumper crops year after year. The scandal of famines in Africa is not a result of 
agriculture approaching carrying capacity--it is mostly a consequence of massive policy failures, 
corruption, ethnic conflicts, ignorance, and incompetence of ruling elites. There are different and 
more complex reasons for widespread undernutrition in some parts of Asia, but they have 
nothing to do with natural limitations. Certain groups of the population lack the means to 
acquire food, which would be available in principle. Here we obviously have the socioeconomic 
and cultural problems of uneven distribution of entitlements. Latin America has vast resources 
of land, freshwater, and--at least in some cases--oil-money. The real problem is the feudalistic 
distribution of land which prevents a more efficient agriculture. 
But could we also feed 10 or 15 billion people? Most likely, if we can prevent (civil) wars with 
soldiers plundering harvests or devastating crop fields with land mines; if we can stop 
collectivization and central planning in agriculture; if we can agree on free (international) trade 
for agricultural products; if we redistribute agricultural land to those who actually use it for 
production; if we provide credits, training, and high yield seeds to poor farmers; if we can adapt 
the modern high-yield agriculture to the agroclimatic and socio-cultural conditions of arid 
regions, and if we use it carefully to avoid environmental destruction; if we implement optimal 
water management and conservation practices. If we do all this during the next few decades, we 
would certainly be able to feed a doubled or tripled world population. 
But there are many "ifs" in our conclusion. Almost certainly, business as usual will not provide 
the conditions which are necessary for feeding the world population of the 21st century. We need 
fundamental political, social, and economic changes, especially in Africa, Latin America and parts 
of Asia. Only a democratization in these regions will open the gates for the development of 
human resources, for better education and training, for private economic initiatives and 
functioning markets. 
There are positive and negative signs that this change will be possible: The governments of 
China, India and some other Asian countries have removed economic controls which chained 
down agricultural productivity; they have provided a relatively stable political environment and 
they have actively supported agricultural modernization (the "Green Revolution"). Consequently, 
they doubled or tripled domestic food production within two or three decades. Many African 
governments, on the other hand, neglected the agricultural sector. They introduced rigid methods 
of central planning, suppressed free markets, and collectivized or coercively resettled the farmers. 
They did not stop the devastation of agricultural areas due to civil wars, and they mostly failed 
in introducing modern techniques of crop production and livestock management. It is no surprise 
that per capita food production stagnated or declined in most parts of Africa during the last 
three decades. 
Let us do a simple exercise: How many people can be fed in Sudan? The F A 0  estimated that 
on a low input level the country's arable land could sustain nearly 60 million people--3.7 times 
the actual population of 1975 (which was 16 million); a high-input agriculture could even supply 
1.036 billion (!) Sudanese, which would be twice the actual population of Africa. All we hear 
from Sudan, however, is the persistent resurgence of famines and the slow degeneration of the 
agricultural system. Theoretically, Sudan could be the corn-belt of Africa--in practical terms it 
is one of the continent's famine areas. On the other hand the F A 0  estimated that Algeria's 
agroclimatic conditions could support only 7 million people at low inputs and 24.6 million at 
medium inputs. Currently Algeria has a population of 25 million and not much is heard about 
food shortages in this country. Given the substantial restraints and difficulties that can slow down 
or even prevent the--theoretically almost unlimited--increase of global food production, we have 
to cut down our expectations. It is unlikely that the world food problem will be solved within the 
next decades, despite the fact that it would be possible in theory. There are  serious social, 
economic, and political limits to growth. 
We should return to the initial concept that visualizes the problem of carrying capacity in a pipe 
with declining diameter. Using this image, we can conclude that the key for balancing people and 
food is the speed with which the social, economic, cultural and political constraints are pushed 
back that hinder people to utilize the full potential of the earth's food resources in a sustainable 
way. If we can open the pipe quickly enough, if we can stop some of our collective stupidities, 
we could produce more than enough food for the people of the 21st century. The carrying 
capacity of the earth is not a natural constant-it is a dynamic equilibrium, essentially determined 
by human action. 
APPENDIX TABLES 
Table 1. Potential population supporting capacity in 1975 by input level. Source: 
FAO/UNDP/IIASA (1982): op cit. 
Actual Potential Population, 1975 
Population 
1975 Low Input Medium Input High Input 
Africa 380.2 1,121.9 4,391 .O 12,872.5 
Southwest Asia 136.3 107.3 173.0 267.7 
Central America 106.6 1 75.5 451.5 1,226.6 
South America 215.8 1,313.7 5,187.0 12,349.3 
Southeast Asia 1,117.7 1,247.5 3,376.7 5,690.6 
Total 1,956.6 3,965.9 13,579.2 32,406.7 
Table 2. Potential population supporting capacity in 2000 by input level. Source: 
FAO/UNDP/IIASA (1982): op cit. 
Actual Potential Population, 2000 
Population 
2000 Low Input Medium Input High Input 
Africa 780.1 1,253.7 4,488.6 12,868.1 
Southwest Asia 264.8 180.1 239.6 324.8 
Central America 215.2 292.3 556.7 1,293.4 
South America 392.6 1,417.6 5,288.3 12,375.3 
Southeast Asia 1,937.7 2,463.6 4,358.3 6,333.7 
Total 3,590.4 5,607.3 14,93 1.5 33,195.3 
Table 3. Selected countries with massive surplus of land resources in 1975 by input level. 
Source: FAO/UNDP/IIASA (1982): op cit. 
Actual Potential Population, 1975 
Population (Carrying Capacity of Land) 
1975 Low Input Medium Input High Input 
............................................................................................................... 
Angola 6.2 53.2 279.2 93 1.3 
Argentina 25.4 151.8 437.9 924.1 
Bolivia 4.9 77.9 309.0 726.6 
Cameroon 7.5 76.8 209.2 61 2.9 
Central African Rep. 2.0 44.8 21 1.8 597.7 
Congo 1.4 40.4 162.4 405.4 
Gabon 0.5 41.8 126.8 280.5 
Paraguay 2.6 34.4 128.4 309.7 
Sudan 16.0 59.4 238.7 1,036.4 
Zaire 24.5 291.9 1,281 .O 2,887.7 
Table 4. Selected countries with massive surplus of land resources in 2000 by input level. 
Source: FAO/UNDP/IIASA (1982): op cit. 
Actual Potential Population, 2000 
Population (Carrying Capacity of Land) 
2000 Low Input Medium Input High Input 
Angola 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Central African Rep. 
Congo 
Guyana 
Malaysia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Table 5. Selected critical countries with massive land resource deficits in  1975 by input level.* 
Source: FAO/UNDP/IIASA (1982): op cit. 
Actual Potential Population, 1975 
Population (Carrying Capacity of Land) 
1975 Low Input Medium Input High Input 
Bangladesh 
Egypt 
l ran 
Yemen, AR 
Pakistan 
Afghanistan 
Israel 
Saudi Arabia 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
We did not include small Gulf states with less than 1 million population (United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman) and small islands (Cape Verde, Antigua, Barbados, Mauritius, Neth. Antilles, 
Singapore). All of these also have very critical land resource deficits. 
Table 6. Selected critical countries with massive land resource deficits in 2000 by input level.* 
Source: FAO/UNDP/IIASA (1982): op cit. 
Actual Potential Population, 2000 
Population (Carrying Capacity of Land) 
2000 Low Input Medium Input High Input 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Saudi Arabia 
Israel 
Afghanistan 
Rwanda 
Yemen, AR 
l ran 
Bangladesh 
Iraq 
* We did not include the smaller Gulf states (United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman) 
and small islands (Cape Verde, Antigua, Barbados, Mauritius, Neth. Antilles, Singapore). All of these also 
have very critical land resource deficits. 
